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Abstract 
 
This article addresses the relevance of national identity to EU and domestic judicial 
practice. It argues that there are two parallel universes of protection in the EU Treaty 
and national constitutions which often pose conflicting obligations to those bound by 
them and which do not communicate nearly enough. Judicial interpretation of the 
relevant EU and national provisions is a welcome development but not always key to 
reconciling differences. To this purpose, the article reflects on the CJEU’s 
interpretation of the EU’s renewed commitment in the Lisbon Treaty to protect 
national identities. It also provides a comparative overview of how Member States 
have construed their own national identity. The latter involves making connections 
with current issues emerging from post-Lisbon domestic case law that this article 
contributes to and advances. As it is illustrated, the respect for national identity 
afforded by the Treaty is amorphous and often fails to capture the level of protection 
mandated by national constitutions. At the same time, national constitutions provide a 
fuzzy picture with different levels of commitment to identity. The way these two 
constitutional charters 1  have been interpreted by European and certain national 
judges will help us identify the different approaches and illustrate the conflict 
between them vis-à-vis the concept of an EU federalised structure. Ultimately, the 
article aims to create a typology of situations where identity retention should be 
reserved to Member States with a view to resolving the current tension between the 
two legal orders. It will point to the possibility for a plurality of ‘limited powers’ 
approach acting as a check on the EU, while avoiding the risk of jeopardising the 
course of European integration. 
 
                                                 
* Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Surrey. This work has been kindly supported by the European 
Central Bank (ECB) Legal Research Programme. The views expressed therein are solely those of the 
author and not the ECB or the Eurosystem. I would like to thank Maria Ioannidou and colleagues from 
the City Law School (where this research was presented in draft form) for their useful comments. All 
mistakes are mine only. 
1
 The CJEU affirmed that the Treaty is the Constitutional Charter of the then EC in Case 294/83 Le 
Verts [1986] ECR 1339. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The role of national constitutions as the utmost expression of sovereignty has been an 
overlying theme of European integration with respect to setting the conditions for the 
interaction between the national and European legal orders. After all, every Member 
State joined on the basis of its national constitution, either on the grounds of general 
provisions regarding membership in international obligations, or on the grounds of 
specific provisions specifically enacted to prepare the national legal order for EU 
accession. As such in the event of further competence transfer to the EU or conflict 
between EU and national law, national authorities are constitutionally obliged to look 
into the conditions their constitutions set out vis-à-vis their course of action. In this 
context, national reservations over the unconditional prevalence of EU law in the 
Member States have recently been expressed through emphasis of the highest national 
courts on national identity retention – i.e. keeping EU expansionist claims at bay by 
protecting constitutional premises which are intimate to the Member States’ own 
identity.  
 
Indeed, the concept of national identity has become en vogue since the coming into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon. On the one hand, EU constitutional scholars have spent 
considerable time and effort trying to decipher the true intentions of the relevant 
Treaty provision (Article 4 (2) TEU) underpinning it.2 On the other hand, national 
judges have not exactly relished the chance to make use of it because the protection 
afforded to identity in their national constitutions (constitutional identity) is often 
different and more intense to that envisaged by the Treaty (as interpreted by the 
CJEU). This article is about the antinomies between the EU and the Member States 
with regard to national identity protection as expressed in the relevant judicial 
discourse and how to resolve them. 
 
The article commences in section II by providing some background on the semantics 
of national against constitutional identity. It then looks into the Treaty’s commitment 
to respect national identity in light of the broader priorities in European integration. It 
moves on into section III to explore national identity from the perspective of CJEU 
case law and demonstrate how the Luxembourg Court has balanced the concept of 
                                                 
2
 For instance the emphasis is often on the history and dual function of Article 4 (2) TEU (the so-called 
identity clause) which can be equally construed to derogate from EU legislation as well as challenge 
judicially its constitutionality. See: B.Guastaferro ‘Beyond the Exceptionalism of Constitutional 
Conflicts: The Ordinary Functions of the Identity Clause’ Jean Monnet Working Paper 01/12; A.Von 
Bogdandy, S.Schill ‘Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity under the Lisbon 
Treaty’ (2011) 48 CMLR 1417; L.Besselink ‘National and constitutional identity before and after 
Lisbon’ (2010) 3(6) Utrecht Law Review 36 
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national identity against other rights and freedoms conferred by EU law. In section 
IV, the article introduces the concept of constitutional identity as it has been 
developed in the law of the Member States and has been upheld by certain domestic 
courts. Ultimately a lapse of communication is revealed between the two approaches 
and suggestions are made about finding ways to re-establish it.  
 
The article identifies key trends in the level of protection mandated by national courts 
in order to explore further the relevance of national identity as a power restraint tool 
against the transfer of sovereign powers to the EU. Particular emphasis is placed on 
the German paradigm which although cannot claim a monopoly of creation of identity 
review, it is perhaps the most robust example of identity retention in terms of 
demonstrating that constitutional court judges are sometimes willing to go to 
excruciating lengths to defend the constitutional integrity of their legal system against 
‘outsider’ threats. Having said that, it is important to note from the outset that judicial 
exposition on the matter of identity currently remains theoretical in the Member 
States and has, therefore, not stabilised the role of unilateral ‘identity review’ by 
national courts as a new basis for challenging EU law. 
 
In search for a typology of cases where identity retention as envisaged by Member 
States is vital for the preservation of their constitutional integrity (especially with 
reference to the ratification of EU Treaties or transposition of secondary legislation), 
we will also look into other national courts, namely in France and the UK. As these 
courts have explicitly addressed their identity concerns, we will observe how they 
have protected constitutional identity and whether their review carries the same 
intensity as that undertaken by their German counterparts. This will help us to make a 
case about the inter-judicial effects of identity review.  
 
The choice of certain Member States as focal points is not merely because they may 
be involved in shaping policies across a much wider range than their European 
counterparts. More important, the courts under study are amongst those that have 
taken lead in expressly invoking ideas relevant to constitutional identity retention. 
Thus, the case studies below provide sufficient evidence to allow for conclusions to 
be drawn vis-à-vis observing trends in the use of constitutional identity by the 
majority of national courts in the Member States.  
 
II. SETTING UP THE SCENE 
 
A. National versus Constitutional Identity: A note on semantics 
 
The focus of this article on the judicial practice pertaining to the concept of national 
identity can assist both the Member States’ authorities and the EU Institutions at the 
vertical level to put their constitutional limits into perspective and measure the legal 
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significance of respect to national identity. Yet, in order to do so, it is important to 
determine whether, ‘constitutional identity’ is stated to be different from the ‘national 
identity’ referred to in Article 4 (2) TEU.  
 
Most of the relevant literature on the identity clause seems to use the terms ‘national 
identity’ and ‘constitutional identity’ interchangeably. Does it really matter? Is it a 
matter of semantics? Let us distinguish between these two perceptions of national 
identity. Simply put, national identity is entrenched in the identity of the citizenry 
which is subject to the Constitution and constitutional identity is inherent in esoteric 
values and principles encapsulated and safeguarded in the Constitution.  
 
National identity can be contextualised by reference to the conventional account of 
'We the People' as constituent power. The idea behind national identity as the identity 
of the citizenry-subject to the constitution is founded on the claim that national 
constitutions gain their mandate from the people who set them up and give them 
authority. Besides, national identity pre-dates the Constitution. As such, timing is 
important because it differentiates national identity from the post-national notion of 
constitutional identity examined below. Accordingly, the Constitution is conceived to 
be subject to amendment or, under certain circumstances, abrogation by the same 
people (demos) who, more often than not, share distinctive national features - a 
collective identity of sorts based on language, common heritage etc (Volksidentität). 
Hence, it can be argued with some certainty that national and constitutional identity 
are often intertwined because the values enshrined in a Constitution are entrenched 
with the identity of the demos.  
 
Hence, constitutional identity or the identity of the constitution encompasses national 
identity as it features in constitutional law. It consists of an element of national 
identity and it resides in sources or assets internal to the codified and principled 
constitutional narrative of national constitutions endowing them with substance. It is 
in this regard that constitutional identity (and not the more generic and all-
encompassing concept of national identity) has often been invoked by national courts 
as a free-standing principle protected under Article 4 (2) TEU in the form of (to use 
the language of the provision under study) ‘fundamental constitutional structures’ – a 
very broad notion indeed. Nonetheless, the Treaty’s identity clause seems to be 
providing a means of protecting the fundamental interests which defending Member 
States may resort to against the otherwise tidal force of EU law. The purpose behind it 
is to safeguard diversity and preserve certain national competences that remain dear to 
the Member States.  
 
Having said that, ‘constitutional identity’ is stated to be different from the ‘national 
identity’ referred to in the broadly drafted provision of Article 4 (2) TEU. Hence we 
are left with two parallel universes of protection – something which makes this study 
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pertinent for future judicial practice. What is more important for the purpose of the 
discussion is that the CJEU’s interpretation of Article 4 (2) TEU seems to be 
undermining constitutional identity. While, therefore, Member States appeared 
willing (at least shortly after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty) to communicate to 
the CJEU what constitutes an aspect of their identity by making use of the preliminary 
reference procedure, the CJEU’s established that national identity as protected by 
Article 4 (2) TEU is a rather limited concept. It neither constitutes a catch-all tool to 
limit the transfer of sovereign powers to the EU nor is an exception to the principle of 
EU law primacy.  
 
In a number of recent cases on Article 4 (2) TEU, Luxembourg judges have stressed 
to their counterparts in the Member States that identity does not enjoy a higher status 
than, for instance, public policy interests do. Instead, national identity is bound to be 
balanced by a CJEU rigid proportionality assessment against other legal interests 
relevant to the advancement of European integration. This is generally an accepted 
state of affairs in most Member States although certain national courts have protested 
that matters are not that simple. Almost as a counter-measure, they have abstained 
from making use of Article 4 (2) TEU as a channel to communicate to the CJEU what 
constitutes part of their identity. They have rather adopted an internal constitutional 
approach to the relationship between the national and EU legal order premised on the 
view that domestic constitutional provisions provide a different approach to national 
identity protection than that which is intended by the Treaty. This inwards approach 
to constitutional identity comprises various areas of national policy and necessitates 
specific in-depth study. 
 
Thus, even if the intention of the Treaty drafter was to bring national identity into the 
primary law equation and - in light of the ever expanding EU competences - recognise 
it expressly as a manifestation of national sovereignty, the result has been somewhat 
disappointing in enhancing communication between European and national courts 
about the latter's status of constitutional identity. As European and domestic case law 
advances we are witnessing a gradually widening schism between respect for national 
identity under Article 4 (2) TEU and the protection of national identity under the 
provisions of national constitutions. To provide an example, against the CJEU's 
reasonings on Article 4 (2) TEU, the Constitutional Court of Germany (BVerfG), in 
its role as the protector of constitutionality against potential transgressions of powers 
by the EU Institutions, relishes every opportunity to stress ominously that national 
identity may not be balanced against any other legal interests.  
 
Taking the above disparity of identity protection between European and domestic 
legal orders into consideration, this article rotates around two interpretations of 
national identity in judicial politics which are manifest in other areas of application of 
EU law where there is potential for conflict – an ‘integrationist’ one which is 
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predominant in the case law of the CJEU and an ‘insular’ one driven by national 
prerogative illustrated by some national courts. Obviously the opposition between an 
integrative approach by the CJEU and an insular approach by certain national courts 
is hardly new or surprising in theoretical analyses justifying the primacy of EU law. 
As such, this contribution aims to reach beyond a discussion of the theoretical 
contours of national identity as a means of reviving the EU law primacy discourse. It 
will observe whether and how the CJEU and national courts are balancing national 
identity against various aspects of European integration. It is important, for instance, 
to observe the potential for mutual influence and dialogue of national courts at the 
horizontal level and the role of express comparative reasoning by these courts in this 
context.  
 
B. Respect for National Identity in the Treaty and Broader Priorities in 
European Integration 
 
Let us take things from the beginning. The EU is under an obligation to respect the 
identities of the Member States – political or constitutional. The Treaty makes this 
obligation explicit. A ‘national identity clause’ was first inserted in the Treaty of 
Maastricht. Article F (1) TEU was the first provision to constitutionalise such 
obligation by plainly stressing that ‘the Union shall respect the national identities of 
its Member States’. The periodic Treaty revisions merely renumbered this provision. 
Article F (1) TEU of the Maastricht Treaty was first replaced by Article 6 (3) TEU of 
the Amsterdam Treaty which in turn gave way to current Article 4 (2) TEU of the 
Lisbon Treaty.3 Not only is the latter provision a lot more comprehensive, compared 
to its predecessors, but it also encompasses binding obligations on the EU Institutions, 
as well as enforceable rights for the benefit of Member States.  
 
Furthermore, Article 4 (2) TEU is longer and more descriptive than its predecessors 
and it is also supported by the preamble to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (the 
Charter) which reinforces that in its action, the EU respects the national identities of 
the Member States.4  What is more, the legal geography of Article 4 (2) TEU is 
remarkable. Respect for national identity is part of the Article 4 TEU package 
including the traditional constitutional/procedural principles of conferral and loyalty. 
                                                 
3
 The origins of Article 4 (2) TEU lie firmly in Article I-5 of the ill-fated EU Constitutional Treaty 
which set out to clarify the perplexity of EU competences. See for detail on the European Convention's 
mandate with reference to complementary competences, including the identity clause: B. Guastaferro, 
'Beyond the Exceptionalism of Constitutional Conflicts: The Ordinary Functions of the Identity Clause' 
(2012) Jean Monnet Working Paper 01/12, 13 onwards. 
4
 'The Union contributes to the preservation and to the development of these common values [the 
indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; [and]... the principles 
of democracy and the rule of law] while respecting the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the 
peoples of Europe as well as the national identities of the Member States and the organisation of their 
public authorities at national, regional and local levels...' 
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Respect for all three principles is therefore fundamental to the good functioning of the 
EU. But respect by whom? The legislature in the exercise of its functions, the 
European Council in its executive capacity, or the CJEU in the exercise of its judicial 
functions? And if Article 4 (2) TEU binds all EU actors, does it bind some EU 
Institutions more than others? 
 
The first thing that comes to mind when reading Article 4 (2) TEU is that as a 
complement to the principles enshrined in the proximate Article 5 TEU (i.e. conferral, 
subsidiarity and proportionality), it is primarily addressed to the EU legislature, 
meaning that the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament are not to 
pursue objectives which may impinge upon the national identity of the Member 
States. Moreover, Article 4 (2) TEU also seems to have the implied capacity to 
restrain the EU legislature from pursuing objectives, which may be compliant with 
national identities but the manner in which they are pursued may jeopardise national 
identities. Although important to the quality of EU legislation, nothing in the wording 
of Article 4 (2) TEU suggests that its application is limited to the conduct of the EU 
legislature. The identity clause implies that the obligations stemming from the 
national identity clause are binding on the EU as a whole. This all-encompassing 
reference provides that all EU Institutions are bound (or, to be more precise, shall be 
bound) by Article 4 (2) TEU in the exercise of their duties. 
 
One could also extend this obligation to the Member States’ governments - they shall 
also respect the identities of their counterparts. For instance, national identity was an 
implicit, but nonetheless, determining factor in the diplomatic incident that occurred 
between Hungary and Slovakia in 2009, when the Slovak authorities refused the 
Hungarian President entry into Slovakia. 5 More explicitly, it can be argued that the 
way a Member State construes its own identity can constitute a limit on another 
Member State’s national identity. In that respect, a limitation to the operations of an 
EU mechanism by one Member State may violate the national identity of another 
Member State. For instance the EU emergency assistance facilities, such as the 
balance-of-payments facility, which operates under Art 143 TFEU, may be affected 
by the strictures of Art 4 (2) TEU.6  
 
Hence, the Lisbon Treaty notes in Article 4 (2) TEU that it is mandatory for EU 
legislation to be compatible with the national identities of the Member States. By 
stretching the protection of national identity in Article 6 (3) TEU of the Amsterdam 
Treaty to include in Lisbon 'fundamental structures' and 'essential state functions', the 
Treaty drafters can be seen as attempting but nonetheless missing the opportunity to 
                                                 
5
 Case C-364/10 Hungary v Slovakia [2012] ECR I-0000.  
6
 The aim of the balance-of-payments facility is to provide financial assistance to non-euro states 
experiencing difficulties with their balance of payments or movement of capital. 
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forge a negative list of areas which are intimate to national sovereignty. One may 
hypothesise about what Member States could have achieved in Article 4 (2) TEU: an 
exclusive list of national competences comparable to that found in Article 3 TFEU 
which provides a catalogue of the EU's exclusive competences. Although such an 
analysis is appealing, as it will arise from the CJEU’s interpretation of the provision, 
Article 4 (2) TEU is not drafted as a clause to regulate competence allocation but 
more as an abstract commitment which in most cases invites the EU legislature to 
exercise a degree of self-restraint regarding the exercise of its powers but lacking 
concrete guidelines.  
 
In our attempt to understand Article 4 (2) TEU, it could be useful to place emphasis 
upon the language used by the drafter: 'The Union shall respect the equality of 
Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities'. In this context, 
’shall’ appears to be mandatory and does not bear other meanings, for instance, as a 
synonym of the more permissive ‘may’.  Nonetheless, ‘shall’ is defined by its context 
and this is where the miscommunication between the CJEU and national courts arises. 
For instance, despite the mandatory tone of the Treaty in Article 4 (2) TEU, the CJEU 
has taken the view that national identity claims may not always be taken into account 
by the EU Institutions in the exercise of their competences.  
 
The idea behind the CJEU's approach is that the EU's intention to respect the Member 
States' national identities has to be counterbalanced against the EU's mandate to 
promote integration. Besides, under Article 49 TEU, a state’s accession to the EU pre-
supposes the adaptation of national constitutions for membership. As a commentator 
has explained, 'the new Member State integrates its commitment and loyalty to the 
integration process in its identity and assumes the whole constitutional patrimony of 
the EU, including principles capable of profoundly modifying its national 
constitution.'7  Against this idea, we can take an opposite view claiming that the 
preservation of national identity is essential to the polity. Since, as discussed earlier, 
identity pre-exists national constitutions, any constitutional modification mandated by 
EU membership does not imply an identity surrender or replacement with a European 
one. No transfer of powers can take place to an extent that Member States can no 
longer be considered independent states.  
 
The CJEU has suggested that both obligations of commitment and loyalty which are 
required from Member States at the point of entry to the EU continue to exist 
following their accession. In this respect, national identity has to be considered 
against a working European (or to put it more accurately) EU identity. Lets us now 
                                                 
7
 R. Bustos Gisbert, 'National Constitutional Identity in European Constitutionalism' in A. Saiz Arnaiz 
and C. Alcoberro Llivina (eds.) National Constitutional Identity and European Integration 
(Cambridge, Intersentia, 2013), 88.  
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attempt to rationalise the CJEU's inner logic. For the purpose of this contribution, the 
much-contested concept of ‘European identity’ is not taken to be synonymous with an 
‘EU-isation’ movement which promotes the degradation of national identities. It is 
rather related to an incremental and voluntary adaptation, occurring through the 
Member States’ adherence to an agreed set of values and objectives which have been 
developed, over time, by EU Institutions.  
 
Values and objectives, such as economic and social cohesion and solidarity among the 
Member States are listed in the Treaty (Articles 2 and 3 TEU) and have effectively 
been guaranteed and expanded by Treaty revisions, EU law-making and the CJEU's 
jurisprudence. These values are shared by all Member States, as they are required to 
be acting together to promote stability and prosperity and to resolve political and 
economic crises in Europe.  
 
A workable EU identity, as referred to in this contribution, is therefore not about 
promoting the denationalisation of Europe but it is built upon a common awareness of 
the purpose of the EU’s integrative project. It is both dynamic and procedural in 
nature and it involves distinct structures of governance which mandate domestic 
adaptation. Traditional national identities are not marginalised as a result of this 
adaptation process - they merely co-exist within a broader setting that includes a 
European identity interacting with the national identity. As such, the anticipation of 
the existence of an EU identity can be considered as a major step forward in our 
understanding of the future of the EU constitutional project, and the role of national 
identities in placing limits on it.8  
 
Seen in the above light, one can partially empathise with the CJEU's inner logic. The 
anticipation of the existence of an EU identity, however, is easier said than done 
since, as we will discuss later, according to certain national courts, the ratification of a 
new EU Treaty is conditional upon not introducing serious changes to the procedural 
and organisational set up of EU Institutions - at least not to such an extent that the 
Treaty will alter ‘the identity of the EU’. For instance, the Danish Supreme Court 
seems to have reserved for itself the role of the final arbiter when it comes to 
monitoring the changes made to the EU by a new Treaty (e.g. the Treaty of Lisbon). It 
has to ensure that any such changes are not fundamental to the point that the EU has 
in effect assumed ‘a new identity’.9  
                                                 
8
 See more on European Identity from an EU institutional perspective: Copenhagen Europeam Summit 
of 14-15 December 1973, ‘Declaration on European Identity’, Bulletin of the European Communities 
1973, No 12, p118-122; European Commission, ‘The Development of European Identity’, 2012. 
Available at <http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/development-of-european-identity-
identities_en.pdf> 
9
 Danish Supreme Court’s decision on the constitutionality of Denmark’s ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty, Danish Supreme Court, Case 199/2012, Decision of 20 February 2013. A similar approach was 
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Where does that leave us? As the case law reveals we are dealing with the conflict 
between two rights. Whilst we can empathise with national courts' protectionism of 
what is essentially their own - we cannot dismiss the CJEU judges' plea to their 
counterparts to look at the bigger picture. Let us now look at how the CJEU resolves 
identity claims before we move on to consider the approach of national courts. 
 
III. PROTECTION OF IDENTITY BY THE CJEU 
 
A. National identity in EU judicial practice  
 
So far, the Treaty obligation imposed upon the EU to show respect to national identity 
has featured in a number of domestic cases involving disputes between individual 
citizens and Member States. We can distinguish between two types of cases which 
may be referred to the CJEU as concerning an aspect of national identity and 
therefore falling within the scope of Article 4 (2) TEU. 
 
First, one comes across situations which concern fundamental constitutional values 
presented by national courts as part of national identity that may be common to the 
Member States (and the EU).10 These are cases that may arise from litigation in all 
Member States indistinctly challenging (to use a hypothetical example) the 
application of a Directive which endangers the right to privacy, protected both by 
national and EU law. When they reach the CJEU, these cases are only resolved in 
favour of Member States following a successful proportionality assessment which 
seeks to balance competing objectives and principles (i.e. that limitations on the right 
to privacy are justified in order to meet the generally recognised objective of 
preventing terrorism).11  
 
Second, there are cases on constitutional provisions which may for instance take the 
form of a language requirement applied to all professionals – e.g. that all teachers in 
Irish state colleges are proficient in the Irish language. Such a requirement may be 
presented by national judges as means to preserve Irish national identity. As with the 
first category above, these cases may arise from litigation in all Member States and 
                                                                                                                                           
also adopted in the past in Ireland. See Supreme Court of Ireland, Crotty v. An Taoiseach [1987] I.R. 
713, 783. 
10
 Here we refer to essential values pertaining to constitutional identity including for instance respect 
for democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. Not only these values are common to the 
Member States but they are equally respected by the EU via Article 2 TEU.  
11
 Although not decided on identity as such, the CJEU held in Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 
Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others [2014] ECR-0000 resulting from Irish and Austrian 
preliminary references that by adopting the Data Retention Directive, the EU legislature exceeded the 
limits imposed by compliance with the principle of proportionality. It, therefore, declared it to be 
invalid.  
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when they are referred to the CJEU, they are again subjected to a proportionality 
assessment (i.e. that a language proficiency requirement is necessary because it meets 
the objective of protecting and promoting a language which is both the national and 
first official language).12  
 
As the above examples suggest, reference to identity appears to offer complementary 
protection to what pre-Lisbon (and even post-Lisbon) would have constituted cases 
argued on fundamental rights protection (in the first example) or public policy (in the 
latter). Nonetheless since the revision of Article 4 (2) TEU, a number of domestic 
courts seem to have preferred to rely on identity. This trend is manifest in disputes 
where a national rule makes it bureaucratically difficult or impossible for an 
individual to exercise a freedom under the Treaty (namely the freedom to move, 
reside freely and exercise a profession). In such cases, EU law has traditionally been 
implicated both by reference to the scope of the fundamental freedom in question and 
the permissible degree of deviation from that fundamental freedom. Also in such 
cases national courts will, more often than not, resort to the preliminary reference 
procedure using Article 4 (2) TEU as a derogation from their Member State’s 
obligations under EU law.13   
 
A national court can claim, for instance, that a Member State’s transposition of a 
piece of EU legislation into national law conflicts with legitimate interests or 
principles which are deeply entrenched in its constitution. These may range from 
diversity and transparency and equal treatment between tenderers to nationality 
conditions for access to particular professions. In this fashion, Article 4 (2) TEU 
provides Member States with an express EU law derogation over the preservation of 
their national identity. Although innovative at first glance, the use of Article 4 (2) 
TEU as a justified restriction to the application of EU law does not revolutionise 
current CJEU practice on express Treaty derogations from EU fundamental freedoms 
under Articles 36, 45 (paras 3 and 4), 45, 62 and 65 TFEU.  
 
The above derogations which broadly refer to public policy, public security, and 
public health, have been interpreted very narrowly by the CJEU. Likewise, national 
peculiarities that fall within the list of Article 4 (2) TEU (e.g. maintenance of law and 
order, safeguarding national security) and are, therefore, intimate to a Member State’s 
identity have already been treated by the CJEU in the same way. It is also unlikely 
                                                 
12
 See for instance Case 379/87 Groener [1989] ECR 3967. Again a case that in the post-Lisbon 
constellation can be fought on identity grounds. 
13
 See for detail T. Konstadinides ‘Constitutional Identity as a Shield and as a Sword: The European 
Legal Order within the Framework of National Constitutional Settlement’ (2011) 13 Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies 195. 
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that Member States would be granted a margin of appreciation to use national identity 
to advance another ground of defence.  
 
As early as 1996 (the same time that the national identity clause of Article F (1) TEU 
was introduced in the Treaty of Maastricht) the CJEU explained that the protection of 
national identity cannot justify the exclusion of nationals of other Member States 
from all the posts in an area such as education (primary school teachers) unless these 
involve direct or indirect participation in the exercise of powers conferred by public 
law.14 No mention was made to Article F (1) TEU or national identity. The message 
arising from the CJEU’s decision is that the obligations of Member States under EU 
law cannot be shaken by considerations relating to the preservation of national 
identity. This is out of respect for the constitutional value of the internal market 
freedoms or the protection of individual citizens who benefit from market access. 
 
Nonetheless, it seems that national courts have developed new defences outside the 
scope of those explicitly mentioned in Article 4 (2) TEU (e.g. prohibition on titles of 
nobility in the state constitution).15 Weatherill argues that ‘Article 4 (2) TEU is the 
door through which concerns to protect national identity enter free movement law, 
softening its sharp deregulatory edge.’16 Although this appears to be true, we need to 
recall that since the identity clause cannot entail a full surrender of the internal market 
to domestic constitutional provisions, the case law on Article 4 (2) TEU has been 
informed by the pre-Lisbon (and, therefore, pre-Article 4 (2) TEU) free movement 
case law of the CJEU on balancing legitimate interests which are not expressly 
protected by the Treaty.17 In other words, national identity has indeed entered free 
movement law but likewise the rules that regulate free movement law have penetrated 
national identity. In this regard national rules may be treated as overriding reasons of 
general interest. We will discuss hereafter in light of the relevant case law whether 
this is a good or bad development for the safeguarding of national competences. 
 
Genuine concerns of public interest have traditionally been recognised by the CJEU 
as permissible derogations from EU law. They include the mandatory requirements 
introduced by the CJEU in Cassis De Dijon,18 environmental protection19 and social 
                                                 
14
 C-473/93 Commission v Luxembourg [1996] ECR I–320.    
15
 Case C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein [2010] ECR I-13693 discussed in more detail below.  
16
 S. Weatherill ‘Free Movement of Goods’ (2012) 61 (2) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 
541, 546 
17
 T. Konstadinides ‘Constitutional Identity as a Shield and as a Sword: The European Legal Order 
within the Framework of National Constitutional Settlement’ (2011) 13 Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies 195. 
18
 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG [1979] ECR 649. 
19
 Case C-309/02 Radlberger [2004] ECR I-11763. 
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protection20 to name but a few. Legitimate interests also include the protection of 
fundamental rights stemming singularly from national constitutions. The latter 
interests are more closely linked to the Member States constitutional identity features 
that have been defended post-Lisbon under Article 4 (2) TEU. Additionally, as 
Maduro commented, ‘the preservation of national constitutional identity can also 
enable a Member State to develop, within certain limits, its own definition of a 
legitimate interest…’21  
 
So what happens in practice when a case on national identity is raised before the 
CJEU and how willing are the judges in Luxembourg to entertain questions of 
national identity? The CJEU agreed in Sayn-Wittgenstein that equality between 
citizens and the abolition of privilege forms part of national identity according to 
Article 4 (2) TEU and can be utilised as a justification for prohibiting the acquisition 
of noble titles.22 Similarly, in Malgožata Runevič-Vardyn23 regarding rules on identity 
cards and passports, the CJEU established that the Lithuanian language constitutes ‘a 
constitutional asset which preserves the nation’s identity.’24 This ‘asset’ is further 
protected by the Charter in the form of respect to cultural and linguistic diversity 
under Articles 3 (3) and 22. It therefore arises that when a Member State reserves to 
take measures towards protecting its official national language (including rules which 
govern the spelling of that language). The CJEU treats such rules as pursuing a 
legitimate objective capable of justifying restrictions on the rights of freedom of 
movement and residence as provided in Article 21 TFEU.  
 
Both Sayn-Wittgenstein and Malgožata Runevič-Vardyn demonstrate that Article 4 (2) 
TEU can be invoked effectively by Member States against Article 21 TFEU in respect 
of matters of civil status (determination of surnames) which fall within their exclusive 
competence. Whether Member States will have the same luck in cases regarding 
Treaty provisions on the free movement of establishment or services where the 
applicant’s economic activity is at peril (as a result of his/her alteration of surname for 
example) is another question. It also seems that the CJEU distinguishes between 
national identity stricto sensu, and its individual declination. While it is stricter with 
the former, especially in allowing the intricacies of national identity to prevail over 
fundamental freedoms under the Treaty, it appears more generous with the latter, 
specifically in order to remove any inconvenience with reference to one’s exercise of 
a profession.  
 
                                                 
20
 Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa [1990] ECR I-1417 
21
 Case C-213/07 Michaniki [2008] ECR I-9999, para 32. 
22
 Case C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein [2010] ECR I-13693. 
23
 Case C-391/09 Malgožata Runevič-Vardyn [2011] ECR I-03787. 
24
 ibid, para 84, 86 
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We shall draw relevant examples from CJEU case law. On the one hand, in the case 
of Anton Las 25 , the CJEU decided in April 2013 that a Belgian decree adopted 
pursuant to the Constitution which specified which language (Dutch) shall be used in 
the workplace in a particular municipality did not survive the challenge against the 
freedom of movement of workers provision of Article 45 TFEU. Likewise, the CJEU 
established that Member States cannot reserve access to the profession of civil-law 
notary to their nationals because the derogation provided for in Article 45 TFEU must 
be interpreted strictly and must be restricted to activities which in themselves are 
linked with the exercise of official authority.26   
 
It follows that although the national identity clause offers governments a way to 
escape some of the obligations that arise under EU law, they enjoy little latitude using 
Article 4 (2) TEU as a de facto derogation from these obligations. As already 
explained, in all cases taking place within the scope of EU law, the CJEU will use its 
established case law on express Treaty derogations and legitimate interests (or 
objective justifications in indirect discrimination cases) to restrict the impact of the 
identity clause through the application of the principles of loyalty and proportionality. 
It is argued that this is in order to ‘bind’ Member States and exert influence over their 
behaviour with regard to their loyalty to European integration.  
 
The above trend is manifest with respect to the duties of Member States under 
secondary legislation on equal treatment of workers. In O’Brien27, for instance, the 
CJEU precluded Member States from extending the national identity clause to exempt 
certain public posts (judges) from the application of Directive 97/81 on part-time 
workers. It held that the UK could not maintain a distinction between full-time judges 
and part-time judges remunerated on a daily fee-paid basis, unless such a difference in 
treatment is justified by objective reasons brought in by the national court. The 
Ministry of Justice’s reliance on the independence of the judiciary was not considered 
to be an appropriate criterion to justify the exclusion of fee-paid Recorders from the 
scope of the Framework Agreement on part time work.  
 
The CJEU’s reluctance to align judicial independence to Article 4 (2) TEU was also 
manifest in the recent judgment of Commission v Hungary concerning the radical 
lowering of the retirement age for Hungarian judges.28 The CJEU held that although 
social policy objectives, related to employment policy, the labour market or 
vocational training, may justify a derogation from the principle prohibiting 
                                                 
25
 Case C-202/11 Anton Las [2013] ECR I-0000. 
26
 See to that extent Case C-51/08 Commission v Luxembourg [2011] ECR I-4231. 
27
 Case C-393/10 O’Brien v Ministry of Justice [2012] ECR I-0000. 
28
 Case C-286/12 Commission v Hungary [2013] 1 CMLR 44. No express reference was made to the 
identity clause of Article 4 (2) TEU. 
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discrimination on grounds of age, in this case, Hungary failed (on proportionality 
grounds) to fulfil its obligations under Council Directive 2000/78/EC.  
 
The CJEU took a similar stance in Torresi, a preliminary reference from Italy on the 
validity of Article 3 of Directive 98/5, which facilitates the practice of lawyers, in 
light of Article 4 (2) TEU. Inter alia, Italy argued that Directive 98/5 permits the 
circumvention of national rules regarding the legal profession which form part of the 
Italian national identity. The question in this case was whether Member States are 
allowed to make access to the legal profession (a service under EU law) conditional 
on passing a State examination. 29  The aspect of national identity or objective reason 
in this case – i.e. the safeguarding of consumers of legal services and the proper 
administration of justice failed to pass the CJEU’s proportionality test.  
 
The CJEU adopted a freedom of establishment interpretation predicated on the 
removal of national obstacles. Having said that, the outcome of this case was mainly 
based on the argument that a lawyer who would be practising under the professional 
title obtained in another Member State (in this case Spain) would not affect the Italian 
political or constitutional structures and thus Italy’s national identity. Perhaps the 
outcome would have been different had the Directive in question required Italy to 
recognise that a lawyer from another Member State can automatically practice under 
the Italian professional title.  
 
Member States need to be cautious that all future cases employing Article 4 (2) TEU 
as an EU law qualified derogation will still have to operate within the boundaries 
established by the CJEU in its case law over the years. Given how prescriptive the 
CJEU has been about the EU constraints that national legitimate interests have to 
operate within, there is no much cause for celebration vis-à-vis how much 
constitutional autonomy can Member States afford by invoking Article 4 (2) TEU as a 
legitimate derogation.  
 
The CJEU has expressly recognised the aptitude of Member States to safeguard the 
protection of fundamental rights as enshrined in their constitutions (such as human 
dignity and equality) and it has entertained the idea of subordinating national 
legitimate interests to judicial review in all matters related to the internal market. Yet, 
at the same time, it has stressed that public policy derogations from the Treaty’s 
fundamental freedoms have to be interpreted strictly so as to be applicable only when 
                                                 
29
 Case C-58/13 Torresi [2014] ECR-0000. Italy argued unsuccessfully that Art 3 of Directive 98/5 
permits the circumvention of national rules regarding the legal profession which form part of the Italian 
national identity. As such, Italy argued, it is contrary to Article 4 (2) TEU and should therefore be held 
to be invalid. The CJEU disagreed and adopted a freedom of establishment interpretation predicated on 
removal of national obstacles. 
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the case at hand entails a ‘genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental 
interest of society’.30 The CJEU also added that the scope of public policy shall not be 
determined unilaterally by the Member States but shall rather be subject to scrutiny by 
the EU Institutions. 
 
The above sentiment aside, the CJEU is not prepared to approach all features of 
Article 4 (2) TEU with a heavy hand and therefore limit their scope of application. In 
ZZ, for instance, the CJEU held in favour of the UK stressing that ‘it is clear from 
Article 4 (2) TEU and Article 346 (1) (a) TFEU that State security remains the 
responsibility of solely the Member States. The question referred thus relates to an 
area governed by national law [which is nonetheless separate to identity] and, for that 
reason, does not fall within European Union competence.’31 Hence, it can be argued 
that at least in this case, which concerned an essential state function and not a case of 
identity, Article 4 (2) TEU served as a means to demarcate national from EU 
competence. Does this realisation alter what would have happened anyway if, for 
instance, the UK had brought the public security argument as an objective 
justification to justify its position? One struggles to see the added value of Article 4 
(2) TEU in setting new limits to the CJEU's old jurisprudence on how Member States 
invoke the Treaty's public policy derogations and judge-made legitimate interest 
exceptions from free movement law.  
 
B. The importance of the principle of proportionality in the CJEU’s ‘identity’ 
discourse 
 
What we can establish from the above analysis of CJEU case law is that the CJEU has 
managed to provide a very specific explanation vis-à-vis the place of national identity 
in EU law. It has somewhat shaped the amorphous identity clause of Article 4 (2) 
TEU. The parallels made in the previous section between the CJEU’s past case law on 
derogations to free movement and its current case law on national identity are 
supported not only by the similar nature of the rights invoked by Member States but 
also by the way in which the CJEU balances conflicting interests. In all cases, the 
CJEU uses the proportionality principle as a means of weighing EU fundamental 
freedoms against national legislation that protects domestic interests (whether 
intimate to national identity or not).  
 
The full content of proportionality has derived from the CJEU’s jurisprudence as it 
has been applied over time. With reference to EU action the CJEU has established 
that ‘the lawfulness of the prohibition of an economic activity is subject to the 
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 Case C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein, para 86. 
31
 Case C-300/11 ZZ v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] ECR I-0000, para 35 
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condition that the prohibitory measures are appropriate and necessary in order to 
achieve the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question.’ 32 
Conversely, when it comes to assessing Member States’ acts, they must not be applied 
in a discriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the 
general interest; and they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective 
which it pursues as well as necessary in order to attain it.33  
 
The CJEU has decided that Member States enjoy certain discretion to decide on the 
degree of protection to be achieved with reference to legitimate interests underpinning 
national regulatory structures such as the protection of public health. This is because, 
like with ad hoc legitimate interests developed by Member States as a means of 
preserving their national identity, the level of public health protection may vary from 
one state to the next. While, however, Member States are afforded a certain margin of 
discretion to achieve different legitimate objectives, the law which pursues them shall 
be singular and coherent according to the Treaty. The reference to consistency in 
Article 7 TFEU qua sincere cooperation under Article 4 (3) TEU (which applies as 
much to Member States as to the EU itself) is reminiscent of the EU’s obligation to 
set up common principles and unified objectives in EU policies whose aim is to 
eliminate contradiction.34  
 
A similar logic seems to be applying in the way the CJEU is assessing objective 
justification defences. It follows that national provisions restricting fundamental 
freedoms under the Treaty to pursue legitimate objectives will only be appropriate if 
the competent domestic authorities use their discretionary powers according to 
transparent and objective criteria attaining, in a coherent and systematic manner, the 
objective pursued.35 By contrast, Member States will not be afforded a margin of 
appreciation where the above basic requirements are not fulfilled, especially when 
other less restrictive means are available to protect their legitimate interests.36 
 
There is a question that emerges with regard to the above proportionality test: Is the 
test suitable for Article 4 (2) TEU claims given that often national identity rules do 
not consist of free movement barriers? Indeed, rules on packaging and selling of 
goods or geographical and demographic restrictions related to the performance of a 
particular service in the internal market can hardly be invoked as aspects of national 
                                                 
32
 See Case C-331/88 Fedesa [1990] ECR-I4023, para 13. 
33
 Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165. 
34
 See on consistency E. Herlin-Karnell E. and T. Konstadinides, ‘The Rise and Expressions of 
Consistency in EU Law: Legal and Strategic Implications for European Integration’ (2013) 15 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 139. 
35
 See Case C-539/11 Ottica [2013] ECR I-0000, para 44-45.  
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 Case C-265/06 Commission v Portugal [2008] ECR I-2245. 
Accepted  copy: (2015) 34 (1) Yearbook of European Law 127-169  18 
identity in the same way as, for instance, respect for a Member State’s high regard for 
autonomous collective bargaining.37 With regard to the latter cases, the CJEU may 
follow its jurisprudence on fundamental rights. In the past it has established that apart 
from diminishing Member States’ actions under an EU law derogation, fundamental 
rights may be solely relied upon as an EU law derogation themselves. The CJEU has, 
likewise, adapted the principle of proportionality to a new approach on the 
relationship between market freedoms and fundamental rights.38  
 
We may recall here that the CJEU has managed pragmatically the conflict between 
fundamental rights and fundamental market freedoms. 39  The CJEU has long 
established that since both the EU and the Member States are required to respect 
fundamental rights, their protection is a legitimate interest which justifies restrictions 
upon EU law obligations. Equally, the protection of fundamental rights as an attribute 
of constitutional identity runs like a leitmotif in the majority of post-Lisbon case law 
on Article 4 (2) TEU. National identity has been interpreted as synonymous with 
constitutional autonomy and national self-determination, including concerns over the 
protection of fundamental constitutional rights or, in pre-Lisbon terms, legitimate 
interests. Like in Schmidberger, such interests are weighed by the CJEU taking into 
account all circumstances of the case at hand in order to strike the right balance 
between them. 
 
The purpose of proportionality in such cases is not only to make sure that the 
restriction in question shall be suitable for ensuring the attainment of the legitimate 
objective pursued and shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it. Next to 
suitability and necessity the CJEU has added another limb to its proportionality test, 
namely proportionality stricto sensu.40 This development implies that proportionality 
may also be employed as an explicit balance of interests.  
 
Yet, the proportionality stricto sensu model is not always functional for the 
assessment of national identity claims based on Article 4 (2) TEU. There are 
situations where the CJEU’s proportionality test based on suitability and necessity 
seems somewhat outdated in the post-Lisbon setting. This is because EU law 
derogations on legitimate interests no longer concern solely the resolution of conflicts 
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 Having said that, one may still argue that Member States could resort to national identity to defend 
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38
 Case C-438/05 Viking [2007] ECR I-10779; Case C-341/05 Laval [2007] ECR I-11767. 
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arising between the economic and non-economic values and objectives. Instead, two 
crucial developments have taken place. First, as discussed, most Article 4 (2) TEU 
cases involve Member States invoking fundamental rights as a means of derogating 
from EU law. Second, the introduction of Article 4 (2) TEU coincided with the 
reshuffling of Article 6 TEU which currently boosts the EU's commitment to 
fundamental rights protection by, inter alia, making the Charter binding and 
applicable in all cases where Member States are acting within the scope of EU law.41  
 
The above developments reveal that the habitual conflict between national law and 
EU law has transformed and now includes two possible scenarios of discord between 
the EU and the Member States. The first scenario involves the classic national 
fundamental rights against EU fundamental freedoms clash examined above. The 
second scenario is about a more intricate national fundamental rights against EU 
fundamental rights confrontation. With reference to the second scenario, not only has 
the Charter’s increased relevance as a benchmark for the validity of EU acts helped 
the CJEU erode the boundary between fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights. 
It has also given the CJEU a platform to balance constitutional provisions, which may 
be related to fundamental rights protection in a Member State, with fundamental 
rights as protected in the EU legal order. This is, however, easier said than done. 
Since fundamental rights protection at both EU and national level also involve 
adherence to the European Convention of Fundamental Rights (ECHR) - even more 
so for the EU after it will have acceded to the ECHR - both CJEU and national judges 
are confronted with a barrage of hierarchy issues. These issues emanate from the 
overlapping application of national constitutions, the Charter and the European 
Convention of Human Rights.42 
 
Given that the above balancing exercise is influenced by the principles of sincere 
cooperation and primacy, it will in most cases conclude in favour of the EU. This is 
the case even when EU law applies remotely to a domestic situation and even where 
the threshold of fundamental rights protection is higher in the constitution of a 
Member State as opposed to the Charter itself.43 Thus, it has accurately been pointed 
out that ‘state-specific constitutional guarantees [even dressed-up as aspects of 
national identity] stand no chance of survival when they collide with the standards set 
by the Charter’.44 What really matters for the CJEU is whether the national provision 
in question would lead to a result which is contrary to the application of EU law. 
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Conversely, the CJEU has made it explicit that national peculiarities endowed with 
constitutional status will not qualify as exceptions from the application of EU law if 
they fall below the fundamental rights threshold set by EU law. This is all the more 
important in light of the Roma repatriation crisis in France in 2010 45 , the 
constitutional crisis in Hungary in 2011 46  and the political crisis in Romania in 
201247. Although national identity was not expressly mentioned in any of these cases, 
future reliance on the identity clause could allegedly assist certain Member States to 
unilaterally escape the all-inclusive character of European integration with all the 
consequences that such conduct may generate.48  
 
Despite the fact that none of the abovementioned crises generated litigation, it is 
likely that in future the Commission may take action under Article 7 TEU to restore 
the rule of law.49 For instance, it is expected that where the invoked aspect of national 
identity falls below the EU’s standard of fundamental right protection, the CJEU 
would stress that national identity shall be broadly defined in conformity with the 
traditional democratic values underpinned in Article 2 TEU such as respect for 
democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law. It is likely that the CJEU would be 
explicit that anything falling below such a minimum level of protection would 
jeopardise the EU’s constitutional integrity or, dare we say again, EU identity. 
 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY IN DOMESTIC JUDICIAL PRACTICE 
 
A. Towards a typology of Identity Retention cases 
 
So far we may agree that constitutionalising national identity in the Treaty adds little 
value to resolving (at least in favour of the Member States) the question about 
whether EU legislative acts should claim primacy upon fundamental constitutional 
provisions. This is the case because of the generic language used by the drafter in 
Article 4 (2) TEU and the CJEU’s restrictive interpretation of it. Put simply, as far as 
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the CJEU is concerned, national identity does not comprise a real limit to the transfer 
of sovereign powers to the EU. Therefore, the case law emanating from the CJEU has 
sufficiently marginalised Article 4 (2) TEU. The identity clause constitutes a Treaty 
derogation which is subject to the same limitations as all other express derogations 
found in the Treaty regarding the scope of EU fundamental freedoms. This outcome 
prompts us to consider whether the CJEU's interpretation of Article 4 (2) TEU is 
amenable to Member States and their constitutions as a complex set of pre-
commitment strategies (through which the citizenry establishes arrangements to 
safeguard the integrity of the constitution from EU self-interest and other problems in 
EU democratic governance), and whether national judges have found other avenues 
outside Luxembourg to protect constitutional identity. 
 
Despite the CJEU's somewhat restrictive interpretation of Article 4 (2) TEU, Lisbon's 
renewed commitment to the protection of identity has presented national courts with 
an opportunity. Indeed, outside the CJEU’s premises, Lisbon's Article 4 (2) TEU has 
provided national judges with a tool to theorise about the likelihood of placing EU 
identity-encroaching acts under close judicial scrutiny at home.50 In this respect, the 
CJEU's interpretation of Art 4 (2) TEU is not as much as an obstacle and the review 
by national courts is based on constitutional identity as seen separately from national 
identity under Art 4 (2) TEU. Moreover, national courts would likely not even consult 
the CJEU on the interpretation of the concept of constitutional identity. We should, 
therefore, take a step back from Article 4 (2) TEU and emphasise the vital role of 
national constitutional provisions already in place prior to the coming into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty which are intended to police identity-encroaching acts. It is important 
to juxtapose national identity as it features in constitutional law (or simply, 
constitutional identity) against Article 4 (2) TEU in order to avoid confusion. The 
former is interpreted by national judges whilst the latter by their European 
counterparts. 
  
Thus, when it comes to Member States defending their constitutional identity, two 
streams of cases broadly stand out. First, we come across cases where constitutional 
courts act as the final constitutional arbiters of competence transfer regarding the 
signing and ratification of a new EU Treaty or Act of Accession (e.g. new Member 
States). This is a review in which the majority of national constitutional and highest 
courts engage in, especially when a substantial change takes place in the final 
agreement that their governments are called to sign. Second, national courts use 
national identity to habitually review the compatibility of EU law with the 
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Constitution in the context of transposition of pervasive EU secondary legislation. In 
both cases, the Member States’ models of identity review remain, up to the present 
day, a theoretical possibility and, therefore, idle. Nonetheless judicial review is 
intended to create a further constitutional check on EU integration by protecting rights 
and promoting deliberative democracy at home. We will therefore, look at the above 
categories and examine the theoretical benefits and constraints of identity review in 
the Member States with regard to posing legal limits that be delimited and discerned 
with some clarity. We will also enquire whether there are new types of cases where 
national courts have resorted to their identity review. 
 
i) National Identity in the context of Treaty Ratification / Accession Treaties 
 
In the first category of cases (constitutionality of Treaties), national courts generally 
stress that the principle of a state ruled by law and the doctrine of popular sovereignty 
(democracy) are unamenable to change. In other words, the transfer of competence to 
the EU has to respect certain limits. National judges seem reticent to engage in a 
pluralist interpretation when it comes to higher constitutional principles and, 
therefore, establish any dialogue with their European counterparts. The idea is that if 
Treaty amendment gives rise to a more extensive delegation of the competence to the 
EU and a more extensive interference with the national constitution, it is necessary to 
seek the approval of the people as the holder of supreme power and presumably 
amend the Constitution to that effect.  
 
The above take on identity is hardly new. It is implicit in judicial reasoning across 
most Member States. It has been particularly prominent in Denmark, Germany, Italy 
and a number of new Member States which have ruled on the compatibility of a 
Treaty amendment or an Accession Treaty with their constitutions. In this context, it 
is unlikely that national courts will refer to the CJEU something that the latter Court 
has no competence to adjudicate on – i.e. the compatibility of what in effect is a new 
Treaty with their national constitutions. In this regard, it is for the courts of Member 
States to ascertain the compatibility of EU law with national law by looking inwards 
and explaining the position on ratification by reference to the constitutional document 
as the highest law. 
 
In Denmark, for instance, according to para 20 of the Constitution any delegation of 
powers can take place only to ‘international authorities’ established by ‘mutual 
agreement’ with ‘other states’ for the promotion of ‘international rules of law and 
cooperation’.51 It is assumed that according to the Constitution no transfer of powers 
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can take place to such an extent that Denmark can no longer be considered an 
independent state. The determination of the limits of power transfer must rely almost 
exclusively on considerations of a political nature. Likewise, in Italy the 
Constitutional Court (Corte Costituzionale) has principally recognised the primacy of 
EU law as well as the monopoly of the CJEU over its interpretation but has reserved 
the right to ‘review the act implementing the Treaty as regards compliance with basic 
[…] principles of the Italian Constitution and the inalienable rights of the person.’52 
Hence the Corte Costituzionale has reserved the right to examine the constitutionality 
‘of the continuing compatibility of the Treaty with the said principles’ even at risk that 
such an approach could call into question Italy’s remaining in the EU. 
 
We can deduct that constitutional identity as understood by the majority of Member 
States has historically, but rather implicitly, provided protection in the process of 
assessing the compatibility of Treaty revision with a Member State’s democratic 
mandate. The important role of direct democracy, as a prime expression of 
constitutional identity, has been expressed in some Member States through the 
occasional use of referendums. Such has been the case in Ireland where in Crotty v. 
An Taoiseach the Irish Supreme Court stressed that that Ireland could not ratify the 
Single European Act unless the Constitution was changed - by means of referendum - 
to allow the ratification. More recently, the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal expressed 
similar reservations with reference to the existence or absence of contradiction 
between the Constitution and the EU Constitutional Treaty. Following a confirmation 
of its compatibility with the Spanish Constitution a successful referendum was held in 
Spain.53 
 
Younger Member States have also expressed similar concerns to their counterparts 
with reference to the role of democracy and sovereignty in the process of EU 
Accession or Treaty revision. In Poland, in a case concerning Poland’s accession to 
the EU, the Constitutional Tribunal stressed that the Constitution prevents the transfer 
of competences insofar as it would lead to the Republic’s loss of a status as a 
sovereign State. 54  In Latvia, on the other hand, in a case concerning the 
constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty, the Constitutional Court found that the Treaty 
did not have an influence on state sovereignty and democracy as enshrined in Article 
2 of the Constitution.55 A Similar stance was adopted by the Czech Constitutional 
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 Corte Costituzionale, Decision no. 183/1973 
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 Tribunal Constitucional, Judgment of 13 December 2004, DTC 001/2004. 
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 Trybunal Konstytucyjny, Judgments of 11 May 2005, K 18/04.  
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 Satversmes Tiesa, Judgment of 7 April 2009. 
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Court in which, in its judgment concerning the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, held 
that the ratification of the Lisbon Treary carried with it no loss of sovereignty. Having 
said that, the Czech Constitutional Court was explicit about the fact that a change in 
the essential requirements for a democratic state governed by the rule of law is 
impermissible by explicit wording of the constitution, and that legal norms may not 
be interpreted in such a way as to threaten the democratic foundations of the state.56  
 
The above constitutional barriers for further integration are also inherent in the 
German tradition and were exemplified by the BVerfG in its seminal Lisbon Urteil. 
The difference with the approaches examined above lies in that the BVerfG made 
explicit reference to constitutional identity in the context of Treaty amendment as an 
instrument of internal judicial review. The BVerfG agreed that constitutional identity 
is encapsulated in a number of unalterable principles (such as human dignity, 
freedom, equality, justice and other essential democratic principles) under the eternity 
clause of Article 79 (3) GG which in some ways are reminiscent of the EU objectives 
listed in Article 3 TEU.57 It was emphasised that these principles are not susceptible to 
amendment without express conferral by the German citizenry. The BVerfG, 
therefore, linked the constituent power of popular sovereignty with democratic self-
determination (i.e. the right to vote) of the peoples of the Member States. The Lisbon 
Urteil is an enormously symbolic decision because it made it explicit that 
constitutional claims in Germany would not only take place when EU Institutions act 
beyond their attributed powers but also when the constitutional identity of the 
Grundgesetz is going to be distorted as a result of a serious shift in competence 
delimitation.  
 
The German concept of identity has received a lot of attention because it is the most 
indicative example of the constitutional identity trend as it relates to areas which 
cannot be subject to revision within the normative framework of the Constitution. In 
its extreme form, however, an insular expression of constitutional identity may trigger 
constitutional patriotism (Verfassungspatriotismus), a concept revived in the Lisbon 
Urteil.58  It is worth mentioning that in crafting its identity review, the BVerfG made 
reference to the majority of national courts mentioned above. This was perhaps a 
symbolic gesture aimed at demonstrating that first, constitutional reservations are not 
the BVerfG's absolute privilege and second, that they have not been shared by all 
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 See for instance the Czech Constitutional Court’s (CC) Second Lisbon Judgment (Treaty of Lisbon 
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national courts with the same intensity. It also demonstrates a certain degree of 
mutual influence of national courts at the horizontal level.  
 
The above cross-reference was repeated by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal which 
in a case regarding the constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty, it decided to look into 
national identity cases from other Member States' constitutional courts.59  Indeed, 
German judicial practice on constitutional identity review has been influential for 
constitutional and high courts of other Member States.60 For instance, in an internal 
case regarding the possibility for judicial review of the Croatian Special Tax Act, the 
Croatian Constitutional Court quoted the BVerfG as an authority in determining the 
borderline on which constitutionalism of social rights clashes with democracy. The 
Constitutional Court referred to the problem created by the expression of social state 
and social justice as principles of constitutional identity. It noted that the standards for 
determining the borderline in case law were formulated by the BVerfG and they are 
today considered to be the 'ruling guidelines for the work of the European courts.'61 At 
the same time, however, some national constitutional courts have expressly rejected 
several key arguments raised by the BVerfG - one of them relating to the judicial 
application of eternity clauses and the concept of identity.62 
 
So far we may argue that the contribution of national courts in the context of Treaty 
amendment or accession is essential in enhancing our understanding about setting 
limits to EU law’s uniform application qua the fundamental values inherent in 
domestic legal systems including those akin to constitutional identity which may 
hinder the force of EU Treaties. What follows is a discussion on the increasing 
judicial emphasis on constitutional identity retention in other Member States outside 
the context of Treaty amendment or accession to the EU. We will look into identity as 
a potential means of reviewing EU secondary legislation. There, identity retention is 
not presented as an absolute constitutional checkpoint.  
 
ii. National Identity in the context of Secondary Law Implementation 
 
In the second category of cases (implementation of EU secondary legislation), 
identity constitutes a standard invoked where the constitutionality of statutes 
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 Trybunał Konstytucyjny, Judgment of 24 Novemner 2010, K 32/09. 
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 See for an indicative list: Gauweiler (or OMT decision), Judgment of 14 Jan 2014, BVerfG, 2 BvR 
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 U-IP 3820/2009 and Others, Judgment of 17 November 2009. 
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 See case comment by J. Komarek in (2009) 5 (3) European Constitutional Law Review 345. 
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transposing EU secondary legislation is being challenged vis-à-vis the rules and 
principles inherent to constitutional identity. This take on identity is less frequent and 
it lacks a common denominator in all Member States (e.g. popular sovereignty). Each 
national court places different emphasis on constitutional premises that it regards as 
essential and, therefore, immune from the tidal effect of EU law. Furthermore, while 
in the previous category Member States could legitimately subject the signing of a 
new Treaty to an internal identity review, they do not seem to be able to do the same 
with regard to the transposition of secondary legislation. This is because the latter 
goes hand in hand with the principle of sincere cooperation under Article 4 (3) TEU. 
Hence, with the exception of cases of manifest breaches of EU constitutional values 
by EU secondary legislation, a unilateral identity review as a countermeasure does not 
appear to be practical or feasible. Even in such cases, national judges are subject to 
the norms of the Constitution which in most cases also encompasses the duty to apply 
EU law binding upon the Member States. 
 
The above realisation is important in the context of the theoretical scenario where a 
national court finds a piece of EU secondary legislation to be strikingly contrary to 
the State’s constitutional identity. For example, in a case concerning the problem of 
compatibility of an EU Regulation with the Polish Constitution, the Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal stressed that although the Constitution takes supreme position 
over all sources of law (including EU law) it is difficult to reconcile constitutional 
identity with the principle of sincere cooperation which poses a duty for the Member 
States to show the highest standard of respect for EU norms. The Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal stressed that this is an important consideration to have in 
mind when examining the possibility of adopting an insular approach to identity 
retention against one based on dialogue between the national and European judges.63 
In this context, it is understandable why only under exceptional circumstances would 
national courts be prepared to act ultima ratio and, thus, review whether an act of the 
EU institutions exceeds the transferred powers. 
 
Not all states have placed the same emphasis on the principle of sincere cooperation. 
This is especially when the competences that have been transferred to the EU and its 
integration programme prove to be unpredictable. As regards national transposition of 
EU secondary law in Germany, the BVerfG has adopted an approach which 
transgresses the State's loyalty obligation where legal protection of the core content of 
the constitutional identity cannot be obtained at EU level. It stressed in its Data 
Retention Directive implementation judgment, that Germany’s constitutional identity 
charges the State with the task of preserving the citizens’ enjoyment of fundamental 
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rights (e.g. the right to privacy) in both regional and international connections.64 
Although this review produces an outcome that can hardly be described as 
cooperative, the EU Institutions can, at least in theory, hardly oppose it in cases of 
obvious transgressions.65 And there are such cases. In the Data Retention Directive 
dispute, the right to privacy was profoundly breached. In the end, however, Germany 
did not use its identity review but rather fulfilled its obligations under the Treaty and 
implemented the Directive (2006/24/EC) which was subsequently annulled by the 
CJEU in a private action against its implementation for its incompatibility with the 
right to privacy. 66  Conversely, the Romanian Constitutional Court declared 
unconstitutional the domestic provision that transposed the Data Retention 
Directive.67  The CJEU decided the case without making reference to EU law. It 
emphasised that state intervention must comply with strict rules, expressly mentioned 
in Article 8 ECHR, Article 53 of the Constitution and the principle of proportionality 
vis-à-vis the continuous retention of data, respectively.68  
 
The fact that so much emphasis has historically been placed on the German 
experience is merely because the BVerfG regards itself to be competent for deciding 
whether an act of secondary law is ultra vires. As also discussed earlier, according to 
its Lisbon Urteil, the BVerfG will also scrutinise the exercise of EU competences 
through an identity review in order to preserve the inviolable core content of 
Germany’s constitutional identity. This does not suggest, however, that the German 
jurisprudence on constitutional identity is pioneering. The truth is that it came rather 
late to become a focal point for other national courts – at least in the context of 
implementation of secondary legislation. For instance, the French identity 
jurisprudence on the constitutionality of EU secondary legislation started in 2006 (if 
not before69), three years before the German Lisbon Urteil. 
 
The French Constitutional Council (Conseil Constitutionel - CC), which is the highest 
constitutional authority in France, has asserted its jurisdiction to review the 
conformity with constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms of provisions which 
draw from EU secondary law solely when a rule or principle inherent in France’s 
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constitutional identity (identité constitutionnelle) is called into question.70 The current 
stance of the CC with reference to the duty to implement EU legislation marks a shift 
from the position which was valid up until recently and which placed the emphasis 
solely upon the express and specific provisions of the French Constitution to an 
identity-centric one. Yet, contrary to Germany, constitutional identity in France is 
only a means of avoiding the constitutional obligation to transpose EU Directives into 
national law. This obligation is by virtue of the amended French Constitution which 
provides under Article 88-1 that the Republic shall participate in the EU.  
The Republic shall participate in the European Union constituted by 
States which have freely chosen to exercise some of their powers in 
common by virtue of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union, as they result from the treaty 
signed in Lisbon on 13 December, 2007. 
Hence, it appears that the CC brought forward the notion of constitutional identity as 
a trap-door or exception from the general constitutional obligation to transpose EU 
Directives if they conflicted with an explicit provision of the Constitution. It is worth 
mentioning that although the notion of constitutional identity did not appear in the 
early decisions of the CC interpreting Article 88-1 one could see why a new limit was 
set by the CC. The dilemma faced by France to comply with its EU law obligations 
(transposition of secondary legislation) while showing respect for the hierarchy of 
norms (recognition of the supremacy of the constitution) is manifest in its early case 
law concerning copyright.71 The CC provided that: 
[…] the transposition of a Directive cannot run counter to a rule or 
principle inherent to the constitutional identity of France, except when the 
constituting power consents thereto[.]  
The foregoing provisions thus show, firstly, that the abovementioned 
Directive…does not run counter to any rule or principle inherent to the 
constitutional identity of France, and contains unconditional and precise 
provisions […] 
The 2010 decision on the review of the constitutionality of the Act pertaining to the 
Opening up to Competition and the Regulation of Online Betting and Gambling 
marks the most recent formulation of the CC’s tribute to national identity.72 The CC 
stressed that the review which it carries out vis-à-vis the transposition into domestic 
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law of a Directive 'cannot run counter to a rule or principle inherent in the 
constitutional identity of France unless the Constituent power has agreed to the same.' 
In all events, the CC has highlighted the duty of all French courts to review the 
compatibility of a domestic statute with France's EU commitments and, if necessary, 
to make use of the preliminary reference procedure. 73  This approach although 
characterised by a set of peculiarities, both substantial and procedural, that are 
different to the BVerfG’s approach has continued a growing trend amongst national 
constitutional courts where they seem to have swallowed their pride and availed of the 
opportunity to make preliminary references to the CJEU.74  
 
To summarise the position in France, constitutional identity has been construed very 
narrowly compared to the wide German interpretation examined previously. For 
instance, it will only be invoked in exceptional circumstances - when the EU 
jeopardises the essential features of the Republic (l’essentiel de la République). The 
latter encompasses any principle that is inherent in French constitutional identity, in 
both senses of the word ‘inherent’ – i.e. crucial and distinctive (crucial et distinctif).75 
Such would be for instance the principle of laïcité or, in its closest English translation, 
secularism.76  Similarly, the constitutional salience of Catholicism in Ireland and the 
ban on abortion in its constitution could be perceived as essential to Ireland’s 
constitutional identity. 
 
The UK is also new to the constitutional identity retention trend. Nonetheless, the 
constitutional ground is fertile for such a development. Despite the absence of a 
written constitution in the UK, there are a host of constitutional instruments which are 
almost eight hundred years old and regulate inter alia the relationship between the 
Crown and Parliament, the administration of justice and the application of the 
common law. In spite of the availability of the identity clause, UK courts have not yet 
made use of it. The Supreme Court has, however, almost flirted with the BVerfG’s 
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approach in implicitly qualifying certain national provisions as encapsulating part of 
the country’s constitutional identity.77 In doing so, the Supreme Court has resorted to 
a unilateral assessment of which cases are to be considered internal and, therefore, to 
be decided at home behind closed doors and which cases are to be up for discussion 
with the CJEU. 
 
The above logic was recently confirmed in the Supreme Court’s (SC) reasoning in the 
HS2 case concerning an unsuccessful challenge against the high-speed rail link 
between London and the West Midlands brought by H2 Action Alliance, nine Local 
Authorities and Heathrow Hub Ltd. 78  The claimants argued that both the 
Government’s consultation process (which preceded the Parliamentary hybrid Bill) 
and the hybrid Bill procedure failed to comply with the relevant EU legislation on 
environmental impact assessment. The SC unanimously dismissed the appeal from the 
Court of Appeal based on the claim that the government had failed during its 
consultation process to make a strategic environmental assessment in compliance with 
Directive 2001/42/EC. 
 
What is important here is the way in which the SC clarified the scope of EU law vis-
à-vis the judicial supervision of the internal proceedings of national legislatures. It 
established that the latter is only appropriate in case of breach of a constitutional 
guarantee. The SC contended that the Directive in question cannot be invoked to 
review the adequacy of Parliament’s consideration of environmental assessment. 
Likewise, national courts cannot strike down legislation if they conclude that the 
legislature’s consideration of the environmental assessment was inadequate. To cut a 
long story short, the judiciary, cannot by virtue of EU law, subject to oversight the 
inner workings of the legislature. It is remarkable that the SC linked the above 
argument with the separation of powers as being the dominant principle that binds 
constitutional democracies. It did so in a way which is akin to the use of constitutional 
identity by other domestic courts examined in this article.  
 
The SC acknowledged, however, that the doctrine of separation of powers has 
different manifestations in the Member States which give life to diverse readings of 
judicial discretion to review legislative choices. Furthermore, the SC was explicit that 
the internal proceedings of Parliament form an aspect of the identity of the British 
Constitution. As such, they are immune from judicial review or supervision by 
national courts. Referring to the BVerfG, the SC indicatively stated that: 
 
                                                 
77
 No reference was made to Article 4 (2) TEU. 
78
 R (o.t.a HS2AA, Buckingham County Council and others) v. Secretary of State for Transport [2014] 
UKSC 3 
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There is […] much to be said for the view, advanced by the German 
Federal Constitutional Court in its judgment of 24 April 2013 on the 
Counter-Terrorism Database Act […] that as part of a co-operative 
relationship, a decision of the Court of Justice should not be read by a 
national court in a way that places in question the identity of the national 
constitutional order.79 
 
Hence, it is not only important that the SC refused to refer the matter to the CJEU 
because the command paper was merely a proposal and not a framework for decision-
making as such. The SC mentioned that even in the event it had to refer a question for 
a preliminary ruling, the nature and status of a command paper of the kind in the case 
at hand constituted a question of national law and practice. Accordingly, national 
courts are in a position to verify that the requirements of a Directive have been 
satisfied, taking account of the entire legislative process, including the preparatory 
documents and Parliamentary debates.  
 
The SC raised Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 which implies that a primary 
function of Parliament is to debate and pass resolutions freely on subjects of its own 
choosing. Courts cannot question the nature of parliamentary proceedings. This is a 
classic example of another doctrine, that of self-restraint (i.e. courts intervene only in 
the most extreme circumstances)80. The process by which legislation is enacted in 
Parliament is, therefore, key to the British constitutional identity. In the event the 
principles regarding the function of Parliament, as enshrined in the Bill of Rights, 
conflict with a provision of EU law, such conflict would have to be resolved 
internally before national courts ‘as an issue arising under the constitutional law of the 
UK’ and not by reference to the famous Factortame decision.  
 
Let us be reminded that the Factortame concerned an injunction to suspend an Act of 
Parliament (the Merchant Shipping Act of 1988) – i.e. an ordinary statute - because of 
its incompatibility with directly effective rights under EU law, in particular the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality and the freedom of 
establishment.81 By contrast, HS2 was essentially a case about Article 9 of the Bill of 
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Rights 1689 which embodies a constitutional principle related to the status of 
proceedings in Parliament – i.e. a constitutional statute (a concept developed after 
Factortame).82 As such it was for British courts to answer the question of whether the 
European Communities Act 1972 implicitly diminished Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 
which sets express limits to judicial intervention in the legislative process. 
 
Given the above, the main method of identifying constitutional identity is related to 
national law - i.e. the content of the Constitution and the highest domestic courts' 
relevant jurisprudence. It reflects selfhood and is characterised by the need to keep the 
application of EU law in check. It is argued that while the German approach is an 
isolated position based on Article 79 (3) GG which makes certain amendments to the 
Grundgesetz inadmissible, the French is more moderate in that both the application of 
EU law and its limits constitute two sides (or expressions) of the same coin 
(sovereignty). As such, French judges avoid giving substance to the constitutional 
identity of France from the outset. They even refrain from creating a positive list of 
aspects of constitutional identity. They rather prefer not to engage in a process of 
balancing the exercise of sovereign expressions vis-à-vis the application of EU law 
and its limits. This approach is frequented by most Member States in their domestic 
decisions regarding the application of primacy of EU law and it is a workable solution 
to the tension between the two parallel universes (domestic and European) of identity 
protection.  
 
The British attitude is somewhat a hybrid between the German and the French 
approach. While it is established that the effectiveness of EU law within the UK legal 
system is attributable to the European Communities Act 1972, the Supreme Court 
avoids referring a matter to the CJEU when certain constitutional statutes conflict 
with EU law. Nonetheless, the conflict is still hypothetical at this point since HS2 was 
based on compliance with EU law. In all cases, however, the Supreme Court 
demonstrates respect for the principle of separation of powers locating constitutional 
identity in the model of the governance of the state. It follows that no EU legislation 
can compel domestic courts to set aside such a fundamental principle although this is 
still to be determined.  
 
The British approach is somewhat different, however, to the BVerfG which generally 
locates constitutional identity as the individual rights of the voters. In doing so, the 
BVerfG somewhat endangers the separation of powers in Germany by playing a more 
active role than the German legislature in securing the effective protection of 
constitutionally-entrenched rights. But do we now for sure that the UK Supreme 
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Court would not have done exactly the same thing (i.e. legislating policy from the 
bench) if it ruled against the EU? Is it not right for judges to make law but only apply 
it? Indeed, the practice of judicial lawmaking in Europe has accelerated in the past 
five decades. After all, the EU is leading by example. The founding fathers of EU law 
regarded the CJEU as an important repository for representation and preservation of 
the EU ideals.  
 
Taking the above debates into perspective, we can make two preliminary conclusions. 
First, the inter-judicial effects of identity retention with regard to the validity of 
secondary legislation are not monocausal and second that, with the exception of the 
brief reference made by the Supreme Court judges in London to their counterparts in 
Karlsruhe, we are still some way from having a mutual influence and dialogue of 
national courts at the horizontal level so as to achieve a certain level of uniformity in 
the protection of constitutional identity in the Member States. Further thought needs 
to be put into how express comparative reasoning by national courts in this context 
can help Member States iron out the controversies concerning the use of national 
identity as a unilateral review formula of EU secondary legislation. Our study 
suggests that constitutional identity functions as a last resort guardian of systemic 
values at the heart of the Member States legal systems against the implementation of 
EU secondary law in cases of manifest breaches of fundamental rights; the separation 
of powers or any value which is akin to the essentials of the state. In such cases, it 
appears that national courts provide that the State does not have to be favourably 
inclined towards the EU. 
 
iii. Identity review outside the context of Treaty revision or secondary law 
implementation   
 
As already explained, the theoretical significance of national identity retention lies in 
that it provides national courts with a means of unilaterally exercising judicial review 
against EU law. As mentioned, the manner in which constitutional identity is 
elucidated in Germany is particularly important because German constitutional judges 
have reserved the right to carry out identity and ultra vires reviews exclusively for 
themselves and have progressively detached the protection of constitutional identity at 
both EU and national level. The fact that a national court has taken upon itself to act 
as a court of final constitutional appeal for the EU is, nonetheless, problematic for the 
unity of EU law. This is especially because new situations have been identified where 
the BVerfG has raised the theoretical possibility of constitutional objections to defend 
its constitutional identity from EU legislation beyond Treaty revision or transposition 
of secondary legislation.  
 
Following a number of cases on the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, the BVerfG made it clear that the Charter’s provisions do not extend EU 
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competences as defined in the EU Treaties. Not only has the BVerfG has charged 
itself with the task of defending constitutionally-entrenched fundamental rights; it has 
also attempted to measure the impact of the Charter on the division of competence for 
the protection of fundamental rights between the CJEU and national constitutional 
courts. In a 2013 case regarding the constitutionality of a German anti-terrorist 
database, 83  the BVerfG sent ‘a loud signal to the CJEU’ following the latter’s 
controversial judgment in Åkerberg Fransson with reference to the principle of ne bis 
in idem (laid down in Article 50 of the Charter) in taxation cases.84 In the Terrorist 
Database case, the BVerfG warned the EU Institutions that it will react to any future 
unprecedented expansion of the EU’s competence in fundamental rights protection 
obtained through the application of the Charter to areas whose link with EU law is too 
tenuous. 
 
Most recently, in ascertaining the BVerfG has challenged the validity of the decisions 
of sui generis institutions, such as the ECB, operating within the EU institutional 
system. Identity review may be applied outside the context of Treaty revision or 
secondary law implementation qua an act of an EU institution such as the ECB that 
has its own legal personality and decision-making bodies (e.g. Governing Council, 
Executive Board).85 In Gauweiler the dispute concerned the legality of the ECB’s 
government bond buying program which was put together in order to defuse the 
Eurozone financial crisis. There were two main issues in the case. First, the BVerfG 
contested the validity of the Decision of the Governing Council of the ECB on 
Technical Features of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) arguing that it violates 
EU rules on monetary policy as envisaged by Articles 119 and 127 (1) and (2) TFEU 
and the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the 
ECB (Articles 17-24).  
 
The core of the BVerfG’s argument is that the scheme is unlawful because it 
authorises the ECB to make unlimited purchases of sovereign bonds on the secondary 
market and, thus, intermingles monetary policy with fiscal policy.86 The ECB should 
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be prohibited from conducting the latter policy, according to the BVerfG. At this 
point it should be noted that, since the scheme’s announcement in February 2013, no 
Member State has yet applied for assistance under the OMT programme. 
Furthermore, the BVerfG placed the ECB’s Decision under the scrutiny of German 
constitutional law due to the fact that it operated without any express judicial or 
parliamentary approval. It was in this regard that its constitutional identity review 
power was mentioned in so far as it can reinstate the default position that fiscal policy 
is only to be exercised according to the principles of representation and of distribution 
of powers. Equally, the Bundestag is responsible for the overall budgetary 
responsibility. As such, the balance of competence would only be restored once the 
CJEU provides assurances that the OMT Programme merely consists of a supporting 
mechanism for the EU economic policies and not one concerning the stability of the 
EMU.  
 
The above stance with regard to budgetary autonomy or financial sovereignty is 
reminiscent of the Estonian Supreme Court judicial review of the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM)87 following a request from the Chancellor of Justice to declare 
Article 4 (4) of the Treaty establishing the ESM to be in conflict with the 
Constitution. Although the request was dismissed, it was stressed that ‘one element of 
the state's sovereignty is its financial sovereignty, which contains taking decisions on 
budgetary matters and on the assumption of financial obligations for the state.’ As 
such, according to the Estonian Surpeme Court, ‘[d]espite the strict sovereignty clause 
the present-day context must be considered in furnishing sovereignty.’88 
 
Likewise, the BVerfG has not adopted a unified and coherent approach when it comes 
to exercising its power to impose identity safeguards and locks upon the EU 
Institutions. It is consistent, however, in that its review remains purely theoretical / 
hypothetical and that it has on all occasions been triggered as a means of getting 
assurances from both the EU and the domestic institutions that the balance of 
competence between the EU and the Member States has not been transgressed. As 
discussed earlier, in the Lisbon Urteil the BVerfG even threatened the EU Institutions 
with unilateral action – an identity review to cover situations where the EU legislature 
has acted intra vires but nonetheless has impinged upon intimate areas attributed to 
constitutional identity.  
 
                                                                                                                                           
States. Its reasoning was purely made on legal grounds - i.e. whether the OMT programme marked an 
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Using a softer tone, in the Data Retention Directive implementation judgment, the 
BVerfG’s reference to constitutional identity became a means to alert the national 
legislature to change their attitude towards EU law by becoming more vigilant when 
secondary EU law measures allow them to exercise their national discretion during 
the process of implementation. This is so that they may provide effective protection to 
constitutionally-entrenched rights. On a similar note, in Honeywell, which dealt solely 
with the ultra vires question vis-à-vis the constitutionality of the German labour 
code’s reliance on the CJEU’s landmark judgment in Mangold on age 
discrimination,89 the BVerfG made a plea to lower national courts. It rejected the 
constitutional complaint as unfounded and highlighted the importance of resort to the 
preliminary reference procedure as a method of correcting wrongful results stemming 
from EU legislation which may be unlawful both as a matter of national and EU 
law.90  
 
In other words, the BVerfG emphasised the duty of national judges to enlighten their 
counterparts in Luxembourg vis-à-vis the intimacy of certain policy areas to the 
constitutional identity of the State. This is a constitutional requirement according to 
Article 101 (1) GG which stresses that no one may be removed from the jurisdiction 
of his lawful judge. Accordingly, the CJEU is the lawful judge to rule on the 
questions of EU law. Having said that, in the Counter-Terrorism Database case the 
BVerfG stressed that ‘as part of a cooperative relationship, this decision must not be 
read in a way that would view it as an apparent ultra vires act or as if it endangered 
the protection and enforcement of the fundamental rights in the member states in a 
way that questioned the identity of the Basic Law’s constitutional order.’91 
 
iv. Identity review following a Court of Justice Decision 
 
The intricacies of the conceptual variations of constitutional identity as expressed by 
national courts give us some insight as to the level of synergy that national courts are 
willing to achieve with their European counterparts by singling out areas that are 
immune from constitutional alteration at EU level (say a Treaty revision) or by 
highlighting the potential, but surmountable, limit to national constitutional 
obligations to transpose secondary legislation. However insular and far-reaching the 
BVerfG’s jurisprudence may be, it makes an interesting contribution to the future use 
of Article 4 (2) TEU. It explicitly establishes that identity encroaching acts are not 
only illegal under EU law but also as a matter of national law. Accordingly, the CJEU 
lacks the competence to interpret the provisions of the Member States’ constitutions. 
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Such an action would be against the spirit and the letter of Article 19 TEU which sets 
the boundaries of its jurisdiction on the interpretation of EU law.  
 
Following the above analysis, it is questionable whether the relationship between the 
domestic and European courts is dialectic. But does it really have to be? The question 
is twofold. First, do national judges make use of the preliminary reference system, 
and if they do, are they inclined to only make reference on a point of law and keep 
quiet about national identity? For instance shall national judges only ask their 
counterparts in Luxembourg about whether a particular secondary legislation in place 
is in tune with the powers conferred to the Institutions by the Treaty? What happens if 
constitutional identity features in the case at hand but is not made known to the 
CJEU?  
 
To add more questions, are national judges under an obligation to mention Article 4 
(2) TEU to the CJEU (and be prepared for the latter’s restrictive interpretation) or 
keep quiet so that they reserve the right of identity review for themselves when the 
case returns back to them? In all cases, national courts seem to have the choice of how 
to frame their question to the CJEU. Hence, they need to be careful. This is so that 
even if identity is mentioned anyway by the CJEU during the proceedings as 
entrenched to the right in question, there is no competence to adjudicate on its 
margins given that Member States have agreed to locate the protection of national 
identity in their own constitutions rather than in Article 4 (2) TEU. 
 
With the above in mind, the BVerfG requested, in Gauweiler, a preliminary ruling 
from the CJEU on a number of fundamental issues (including Germany's transfer of 
monetary sovereignty to the ECB). 92  By contrast to its previous case law, in 
Gauweiler the BVerfG finally decided (at least in theory) to enhance its judicial 
dialogue with the CJEU by making use of the preliminary reference procedure in what 
would have otherwise been an ultra vires dispute for internal consumption. Apart 
from the general symbolism of judicial dialogue behind resort to the preliminary 
reference procedure, the Gauweiler case adds a further, and perhaps more political, 
dimension to the debate about possible scenarios where constitutional identity is 
relevant and applicable. This is the case despite the fact that constitutional identity is 
not a central tenet to the case.  
 
It is worth, for instance, raising the fact that constitutional identity does not feature in 
the BVerfG’s preliminary reference request lodged on 10 February 2014.93 It is only 
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mentioned in the domestic proceedings – pronouncement of the judgment.94 On the 
one hand, therefore, the BVerfG’s preliminary reference is compelling the CJEU to 
attach a number of conditions to the OMT program and add to the legal certainty of 
the EU’s counter-crisis tools. On the other hand, it does not invite the CJEU to enter 
into a dialectic discussion over constitutional identity and its intricacies. This is 
because, according to the BVerfG, it is not the task of the CJEU to determine the 
limits of national constitutional identity.  
 
Against the above position, in his Opinion delivered on 14 January 2015, Advocate 
General Cruz Villalón who stressed that the OMT program is compatible with the 
TFEU, engaged with the question and acknowledged the state of affairs as illustrated 
by the BVerfG. 
 
…it is not only the principle of conferral (ultra vires) which is in issue in 
the main proceedings but also the ‘constitutional identity’ of the Federal 
Republic of Germany; that is so because of the consequences which the 
contested act is said to entail for the national constitutional body which is 
first and foremost responsible for expressing the will of the citizens. 
‘Ultra vires review’ and ‘identity review’, to use the terms employed by 
the BVerfG itself, are said to converge in the main proceedings…. 
 
Thus, as regards specifically the ‘identity review’, the BVerfG expressly 
proposes that ‘in the cooperative relationship which exists, it is for the 
Court of Justice to interpret the measure. On the other hand, it is for the 
BVerfG to determine the inviolable core of constitutional identity and to 
review whether the measure (as interpreted by the Court of Justice) 
encroaches on that core’.95 
 
Constitutional identity only comes into play, therefore, following a decision by the 
CJEU confirming the compatibility of the ECB’s contested act with EU law. The 
BVerfG has made a distinction between identity control and ultra vires review. In its 
ruling on OMTs, the BVerfG mentioned that its powers cover both aspects, 
separately. Nevertheless, in the same ruling it also used the argument that where acts 
cover areas that are part of constitutional identity this could be deemed structurally 
significant and thus ultra vires. In the event the BVerfG declares the act of the ECB 
and the CJEU’s interpretation ultra vires the OMT ruling would not be legally 
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binding in Germany and public authorities would be constitutionally bound to 
disapply it.  
 
The feasibility of such a development is, however, more easily asserted than enforced. 
Nonetheless, Advocate General Cruz Villalón used critical language against the 
BVerfGs aggressive tone and stressed that making a trend out of such a reservation of 
identity ‘would leave the EU legal order in a subordinate position, at least in 
qualitative terms.’96 This criticism comes at a crucial moment where the BVerfG has 
unilaterally modified the goalposts of its own identity review - while in the Lisbon 
Urteil it emphasised that the protection of constitutional identity at EU and national 
level went ‘hand in hand’, in Gauweiler it highlighted the fundamental differences 
and disconnection between the two modes of protection while still maintaining its 
preeminent role.97 
 
Notwithstanding the BVerfG’s identity retention advances, we shall conceive the 
preliminary reference in Gauweiler as a call for clarification of the OMT Programme. 
This is especially true since there is a noticeable ennui at the political level about 
confronting the ECB. For instance the German Government did not seek the 
annulment of the OMT Programme by resorting to Article 263 TFEU. Likewise, the 
Bundestag has not so far criticised the OMT Programme as a set of self-contained 
economic measures. Neither has it made any political pronouncements about its 
desirability.  
 
Considering the above, it is apparent that the approach of the BVerfG has prompted 
criticism of the unilateral scope of its judicial competence in allowing individuals to 
litigate against the Bundestag, and the government, for failing to take action against 
the OMT programme.98 As such, the BVerfG in its effort to protect the country’s 
constitutional identity from external threats, can be seen to have slightly distorted the 
orthodoxy of separation of powers (from which each branch initially draws its 
identity). The BVerfG’s way of protecting the concept of national constitutional 
identity can, therefore, lead to internal turbulence between the judicial and political 
branches of Member States.  
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What is more, the BVerfG may be hoist with its own petard by overburdening itself 
with constitutional complaints lodged by politicians disillusioned with European 
integration.99 In this respect, it can be argued that the impact of identity retention as 
unilaterally envisaged by the BVerfG may have more consequence internally (i.e. 
with regard to the separation of powers under the Constitution) than externally (i.e. as 
a means of redrawing the boundaries of EU competence without a Treaty revision). 
On the latter, it remains to see how far the CJEU will echo the Advocate General’s 
Opinion and how the BVerfG will ultimately respond. 
 
National courts have stressed in the past that after a clarification has been obtained by 
the CJEU and ‘in exceptional circumstances’ they may declare an EU measure ultra 
vires.100 The Danish Supreme Court has held that a domestic court may rule on the 
ultra vires nature of an EU measure which though upheld by the CJEU, nevertheless 
‘is based on an application of the Treaty which lies beyond the surrender of 
sovereignty according to the Danish Act of Accession.’ On such a question, under 
Danish law, the Danish court has the final say. Of course there are more extreme 
responses, such as the Czech Constitutional Court’s decision to declare a judgment of 
the CJEU ultra vires. Still, however, as it has been illustrated in the relevant 
commentary that the Czech Court’s reaction was not ‘a result of some calculated 
strategy’ but rather a means to resolve an internal judicial conflict.101  
 
All things said, the problem with the German approach lies in the conviction of the 
BVErfG judges that the distorting effect of EU secondary legislation upon Germany's 
constitutional identity has to be decided in Karlsruhe. Whilst this position has not 
been abandoned by the BVerfG, any challenge against EU acts on identity grounds 
remains a theoretical possibility. Having said that, identity control under Article 79 
(3) GG remains a very powerful tool, as not only does it enable and justify control at 
national level, but it also goes beyond the requirements of Article 4 (2) TEU. This is 
because the BVerfG does not seem to be inclined to weigh the concept of 
constitutional identity against other legal interests. Perhaps this explains why the 
BVerfG’s model of identity review has become a point of reference by, amongst other 
lawyers, British judges. It places considerable discretion in the hands of the Member 
States’ authorities. A downside to this approach, however, is that, in its extreme 
                                                 
99
 See for more detail K.F. Garditz, ‘Beyond Symbolism: Towards a Constitutional Actio Popularis in 
EU Affairs? A Commentary on the OMT Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court’ (2014) 15 
German Law Journal 183, 200-201. 
100
 Denmark, judgment on Maastricht Treaty Hojesteret, Judgment of 6 April 1998 – I 361/1997. The 
Danish Supreme Court ruled that Danish courts must comply with judgments of the CJEU unless they 
have good cause to believe that an EU measure is ultra vires with regard to the Danish Constitution. In 
such a case, the Danish Court must refer the question to the CJEU for clarification. 
101
 Czech Republic, Ústavni Soud, Judgment of 31 January 2012 – 2012/01/31 – Pl. ÚS 5/12. See case 
note by J. Komarek (2012) 8 (2) European Constitutional Law Review 323, especially the first two 
sentences in the Conclusion at 336. 
Accepted  copy: (2015) 34 (1) Yearbook of European Law 127-169  41 
version, identitätkontrolle may generate a subjective, and even erratic interpretation 
of EU legislation.   
 
No doubt, a state-centric interpretation of Article 4 (2) TEU would contradict the 
authority of the CJEU as the supreme court for determining the scope of EU law and 
defeat the principle of primacy of EU law. On the positive side, however, highest 
national courts seem reluctant to go down that lonely state-centric road. Instead, they 
tend to resort to the preliminary reference procedure when Article 4 (2) TEU is 
implicated. First and foremost, the BVerfG itself referred in Peter Gauweiler and 
Others the Outright Monetary Transactions Programme (OMT) to the CJEU as an 
example of a transgression of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) mandate under the 
Treaty vis-à-vis Germany’s budgetary autonomy (an aspect of constitutional identity 
protected under Article 4 (2) TEU).102 Similarly, the French Constitutional Council 
(CC) has declared itself not competent to consider a preliminary ruling on 
constitutionality when the contested provisions pertain only to the necessary results 
stemming from a Directive and do not violate any rule or principle inherent to 
France’s constitutional identity. The CC has emphasised that ‘only a court of the 
European Union to which a preliminary ruling has been referred may control [a] 
directive’s conformity with the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 6 of the 
Treaty of the European Union’.103 
 
Furthermore, even if constitutional courts are reluctant to establish a dialogue with the 
CJEU about the contours of Article 4 (2) TEU, ordinary national courts may do so. 
For instance, in a recent preliminary reference, the Czech Supreme Administrative 
Court asked the CJEU whether favourable treatment of Czech citizens under certain 
circumstances defined by the Czech Constitutional Court was contrary to Article 4 (2) 
TEU. What is more important, however, is the Czech Supreme Administrative 
Court’s question to the CJEU (almost as if it was a parent court on EU matters) as to 
whether it (the Czech Supreme Administrative Court) was bound by the legal 
assessment made by the Czech Constitutional Court if the latter was not on all fours 
with the CJEU’s interpretation of the relevant provisions of EU law.104  
 
Because the assessment of constitutional identity may vary even between national 
courts of the same Member State, over-reliance on national interpretations of identity-
retention only allows for limited awareness of the scope of Article 4 (2) TEU. It is, 
therefore argued that, while national judges can educate the EU lawyer about the 
intricacies of national constitutions, the CJEU’s interpretation of Article 4 (2) TEU, as 
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a device for reviewing the constitutionality of EU legislation has been marginalised 
by the CJEU’s established case law which follows a peremptory approach to the 
constitutional essentials of the EU. As discussed previously, this is especially the case 
in preliminary references where Article 4 (2) TEU is invoked by Member States as a 
legitimate (public policy) derogation from the substantive obligations that arise from 
EU membership. 
 
Conclusion 
This article explored how national identity corresponds with genuine concerns of 
public interest of Member States and individuals with a stake in those interests that 
can be construed as part of a state’s national identity. We witnessed that European 
integration is replete with trends, movements and priorities that the use of legitimate 
interests corresponds with. We took stock of the recent emphasis of national identity 
protection in the Treaty of Lisbon as a legitimate interest and discussed the CJEU’s 
‘integrationist’ interpretation of the principle as a means of setting limits to national 
diversity. We also clarified that protection of national identity under Article 4 (2) 
TEU shall be distinguished from the protection of identity under the national 
constitutions.  
 
With reference to Article 4 (2) TEU, the CJEU has recognised that the EU legal 
system constitutes a ‘patchwork of different national regulatory styles’ 105  where 
national authorities are suitable to weigh up the balance between individual and 
community interests. As such, Member States should be allowed a margin of 
discretion to nourish the dynamic concept of constitutional identity. This is especially 
since ‘the specific circumstances which may justify recourse to the concept of public 
policy may vary from one Member State to another and from one era to another.’106 
However abstract this may be, it constitutes an indication that the compatibility of 
constitutionally entrenched values with EU law has to be ascertained by the CJEU on 
a case-by-case basis. The CJEU has further established that Member States do not – in 
the name of constitutional identity – enjoy absolute discretion to avoid their EU law 
obligations in order to safeguard their legitimate interests. In other words if the 
situation is covered by the material scope of EU law, Member States ought to exercise 
their competences in accordance with EU law.107 There is nothing new under the sun. 
 
                                                 
105
 A. Héritier, ‘The Accommodation of Diversity in European Policy-Making and Its Outcomes: 
Regulatory Policy as a Patchwork' (1996) 3 (2) Journal of European Public Policy 149. 
106
 Case C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein, para 87. 
107
 See Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer [2005] ECR I-10837; Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] 
ECR I-11613; Case C-192/05 Tas Hagen and Tas [2006] ECR I-10451; Case C-135/08 Rottmann 
[2010] ECR I-1449. 
Accepted  copy: (2015) 34 (1) Yearbook of European Law 127-169  43 
This article also looked into broader trends in national identity protection in the 
national constitutions as articulated by national courts, acting in a protective and 
insular manner. In order to do so, we focused on the growing importance of 
constitutional identity as a unilateral national veto of prospective EU law measures 
and/or the unilateral disapplication of existing ones. The study of constitutional 
identity as a nascent notion in the process of scrutinising European integration at 
national level reveals a different picture compared to that portrayed by the CJEU’s 
case law on Article 4 (2) TEU. Constitutional identity in the hands of national judges 
is far more than a legitimate interest – it constitutes a tool for judicial review of EU 
acts. Some judges tend to use this tool more extensively than others in expressing 
their constitutional reservations about the speed of European integration. 
 
Although the German approach has intrigued both academics and practitioners across 
the EU, it appears that each national court has qualified differently the constitutional 
singularities that encapsulate part of its Member State’s constitutional identity. The 
German tradition focuses on the eternity clause and the political value of the right to 
vote; the French on the essential characteristics of the state; while the British on a 
strict separation of powers, which in way is capable of reviving the old debate on the 
reception of EU law primacy premised on the battle between the principle of 
Parliamentary sovereignty and the monist conception of primacy developed by the 
CJEU.  
 
The question is whether in light of the different manifestations of constitutional 
identity national judges will be more proactive to clarify the domestic position by 
engaging into a dialogue with the CJEU (by making use of Article 4 (2) TEU) and 
between them. Even if they prefer speaking directly to their European counterparts, 
there is a ‘functional difficulty’, according to Advocate General Cruz Villalón, of 
requests for preliminary rulings where Member States are not prepared to set things 
right. In other words, the uniformity of EU law will be shaken if Member States are 
ab initio unwilling to consider the possibility of removing constitutional obstacles that 
would endanger the reception of EU law through their constitutions following a 
preliminary ruling by the CJEU.108  
 
Our typology of situations where a constitutional identity review may be triggered 
illustrates that, in general, safeguarding the standard of protection of fundamental 
rights in the national constitutions is essential for the EU. As such, one could argue 
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that despite the multiple fundamental rights sources at EU level the delayed accession 
to the ECHR is not very helpful for reconciling differences between the EU and its 
Member States. It deprives the EU from an external judicial check (the ECtHR), other 
than national constitutional courts. What is more, our typology also demonstrates that 
the preservation of democratic decision making at national level and the principle of 
separation of powers are entrenched in national statehood and identity. These are 
crucial barriers for all Member States and akin to sovereignty. Perhaps, the 
Commission should refrain from treating national protection of all abovementioned 
values which contradict the implementation of EU law as de facto breaches of EU law 
and, therefore, respond with a public enforcement action against Member States. 
Instead EU Institutions should establish a plurality of limited powers approach 
springing from national case studies because there are fundamental principles which 
have no equivalent in the EU legal order. For instance, the European Parliament 
released in 2011 a study on ‘National Constitutional Law and European Integration’ 
followed by another in 2014 entitled ‘National Constitutional Avenues for Further EU 
Integration’. 109 This is a welcome initiative which aims to familiarise with the variety 
of constitutional specificities manifest in the Member States, especially insofar as 
they pose substantive obstacles for further integration under EU secondary legislation. 
 
Conversely, against national courts’ unilateral claims, the CJEU may adopt an 
interpretation of EU obligations under Article 4 (2) TEU where respect to national 
identities is by default subordinate to the Article 2 TEU common values and 
principles forcing upon them the components of a workable EU identity, willingly 
adhered to by Member States. 110  Seen in this light, although it can boost the 
protection of certain national prerogatives, the identity clause in the Treaty of Lisbon 
falls short of being a model for reserving or repatriating powers back to the Member 
States.  
 
Having said that, a very restrictive interpretation of identity from the CJEU may 
backlash with an extremely insular response from the side of national judges who may 
decide to shut their doors to the CJEU and declare that only national courts are 
competent to interpret and apply norms akin to their constitutional identity. For 
instance, a number of Member States may follow the intra vires review set by the 
BVerfG to the letter. This will include Eastern and European Baltic countries such as 
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Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania which traditionally share a more conservative approach 
to European integration vis-à-vis state-specific principles that give expression to 
critical aspects of constitutional identity and include the possibility of subjecting EU 
Acts to constitutional scrutiny.111  
 
Like the saying goes ‘good fences make good neighbours’: The CJEU cannot alone 
determine what constitutes part of the Member States' constitutional identity. This is a 
matter for national courts. Equally, national courts cannot decide unilaterally on the 
consequences for EU law of the invocation by a Member State of the identity clause 
of Article 4 (2) TEU. This is a matter for the CJEU. Good neighbouring and cross-
fertilisation of norms and jurisprudence between the two courts is therefore required 
to ascertain how constitutional identity situates within the spectrum of EU law. They 
should both acknowledge the limits of their jurisdiction and share such jurisdiction.112  
 
The cross-over examination of national and CJEU case law in this article reveals that 
whilst the role of national courts is crucial in warning the CJEU about constitutional 
provisions which are fundamental according to their legal system and taking it onto 
themselves in extreme cases, the CJEU's role is equally essential in granting those 
national courts a margin of discretion to realise the objectives that spring out of these 
provisions. In some cases this may be convenient; in others it may be impractical. 
Indeed, ‘good fences build good neighbours, but so does good open conversation over 
the fences.’113 A typology of situations where identity retention shall be reserved to 
the Member States is helpful but still the protection of national identity is bound to 
remain a combination of principles which often flow to each other but at times are 
oppositional. 
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